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This paper studies the effect of the 1996 welfare reform on single mothers, focusing 
on two important aspects. First, it examines the existence of programme substitution 
between SSI and former AFDC/TANF recipients after the reform. Second, it examines 
the prevalence of single mothers who were disconnected from government assistance 
and the job market since the reform and evaluates their long-term well-being. Using 
three major nationally representative surveys, difference-in-difference analysis, and 
logistic regression models, I arrive at four main findings. First, I find no evidence of a 
programme substitution effect between AFDC/TANF and SSI. Second, the five-year 
time limit policy is suggested as being responsible for part of the increase in the 
disconnected rate among single mothers. Third, disconnected single mothers did not 
face a food insecurity problem after welfare reform. Fourth, disconnected single 
mothers allocate much more time to personal entertainment than to productive 
activities such as housework and child care. While the 1996 welfare reform has 
succeeded in reducing AFDC/TANF caseloads, policy makers should pay attention to 
its effects on the disconnectedness of single mothers and help such women leave their 
disconnected status. 
 





本文研究了在 SSI 和 AFDC/TANF 兩個政府福利計劃之間是否存在替代效應。其
次，本文研究了福利制度改革是否令到更多的單身母親變得邊緣化(沒有參與工
作亦沒有領取政府福利)，以及研究她們的長期生活情況。利用美國三個具代表
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1. Introduction 
The 1996 welfare reform in the United States is one of the most important 
welfare benefit reforms in history. It was aimed at reducing welfare dependency, 
reducing the burden on the federal budget, and encouraging the employment of 
recipients, especially single mothers. To this end, federal legislation and other state 
policies were changed to make the programme more job oriented, requiring welfare 
recipients to take up some job-related activities and imposing time limits on benefits. 
As policy makers expected, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children/Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (AFDC/TANF) caseload dropped dramatically, from 4 
million in 1990 to 2.5 million in 1999.1 Though robust economic activity during that 
period may have been the most important driver of the drop in welfare rolls, 
researchers suggest that the 1996 welfare reform is at least partly responsible for this 
decline (Blank, 2002; Grogger and Karoly, 2005)2. Still, this significant drop in 
caseloads does not tell us whether single mothers who left AFDC/TANF made 
successful transition to self-sufficiency. First, if most of the former welfare recipients 
simply shift to other government benefits programmes, the drop in AFDC/TANF rolls 
would be meaningless for the federal government. Second, single mothers leaving 
AFDC/TANF can become ‘disconnected’ from both government assistance and the 
                                                             
1 Official data from the Administration for Children and Families, Office of Family Assistance, US 
Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC, 2012. 
2 Blank (2002) and Grogger and Karoly (2005) show that the incomes of single-mother families rose 
and poverty rates fell relative to a number of control groups in the years following welfare reform. 
2 
job market.3 Therefore, for a comprehensive evaluation of the 1996 welfare reform, 
one should assess the change in the material well-being of this most disadvantaged 
group. This paper focuses on two important issues. First, it examines programme 
substitution from AFDC/TANF to Supplemental Security Income (SSI) since the 
reform. Second, it examines the prevalence of single mothers who were disconnected 
from government assistance and the job market since the reform and evaluates their 
long-term well-being. 
Using several large-scale datasets, this paper’s findings are summarized as 
follows. First, there is no programme substitution effect between AFDC/TANF and 
SSI and the decline of the AFDC/TANF caseload can be considered to be an 
equal-sized reduction in the total caseload of government assistance programmes. 
Therefore, the federal budget burden of benefit programmes has been reduced. 
Second, welfare reform as a whole does not have an effect on the probability of 
disconnectedness, but the five-year time limit policy seems to be responsible for part 
of the increase in the disconnected rate among single mothers. Third, the food 
consumption level of disconnected single mothers experienced a slight decline since 
welfare reform, suggesting they are unlikely to face a food insecurity problem. Fourth, 
disconnected single mothers do not allocate their spare time effectively since most of 
the time is spent on personal entertainment rather than productive activities such as 
housework and child care. 
                                                             
3 Based on our calculation from the current population survey, the disconnected rate of single mothers 
rose from 10.30% in 1990 to 15.06% in 2001. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of this paper reviews 
elements of the 1996 welfare reform. Section 3 reviews the literature on welfare 
leavers. Section 4 describes the data and presents the model. Section 5 studies the 
existence of programme substitution. Section 6 studies the rise in disconnected single 
mothers. Section 7 evaluates the long-term well-being of disconnected single mothers. 
Discussion and policy implications are provided in Section 8 and Section 9 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. The AFDC Programme and the 1996 Welfare Reform4 
The AFDC programme was a well-known transfer programme for the poor in the 
United States. It provided cash financial support to low-income families with 
‘dependent’ children, defined as children deprived of the support or care of one 
natural parent by reason of death, disability, or absence from the home, and who are 
under the care of the other parent or another relative. In practice, the vast majority of 
welfare recipients are single mothers. For a long time, the programme was intended to 
allow mothers to stay at home and take care of their children rather than be forced to 
work. As the result, most states set a ‘100%’ benefit reduction rate, meaning that 
AFDC benefits would be reduced dollar for dollar for every extra dollar of earnings. 
Starting in the 1960s, some reforms illustrated the increasing emphasis on work by 
                                                             
4 This section is a brief introduction to the 1996 welfare reform and draws partly from Moffitt (2003). 
The main comparison between AFDC and TANF is presented in the Table A.1.  
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lowering the benefit reduction ratio from 100% to 67% and introducing job search 
and basic skills training programmes. 
Several states were granted federal waivers to implement their own welfare 
programmes at the beginning of early 1980s, but it was not until the early to 
mid-1990s that major, state-wide waivers were approved and implemented. States 
with waivers have permission to employ a stricter AFDC welfare policy, for example, 
imposing time limits, incorporating work requirements, and introducing stronger 
sanctions for noncompliance. As of 1996, around 31 states had implemented some 
type of welfare waiver and research showed that these waivers played an important 
role in decreasing AFDC caseloads before 1996 (Blank, 2002; Council of Economic 
Advisers, 1999; Levine and Whitmore, 1998). 
In 1996, the welfare system underwent a structural reform and the AFDC 
programme was replaced by the TANF programme. In particular, the 1996 welfare 
reform imposed a strict work requirement: the required hours of work per week were 
greatly increased to 30 hours per week for single mothers and more for two-parent 
families. Applicants for TANF benefits were required to register for a job search 
programme before benefit receipt began. The 1996 welfare reform also imposed time 
limits on benefits, a new concept in US transfer programmes, aimed to reduce 
dependency. Specifically, a recipient could not receive benefits for more than 60 
months over his or her lifetime, although up to 20% of caseloads could be exempt 
from this requirement. Those who failed to comply with the new requirements would 
5 
be punished, normally beginning with an initial partial sanction at first noncompliance 
and then graduating to a more severe, full sanction with subsequent noncompliance. 
[Table A.1 Here] 
3. Literature Review 
This section first reviews studies investigating the increasing employment rate of 
single mothers since welfare reform and then covers research about the programme 
substitution effect between the SSI and AFDC/TANF programmes. Finally, it revisits 
papers related to disconnected single mothers. 
3.1. Employment of single mothers 
A number of studies support the argument that the reform has succeeded in its 
main employment objective, with a dramatic increase in employment rate among 
single mothers since 1996. Moffitt (2002) estimates that the employment rate of 
single mothers surged from 60% in 1994 to 72% in 1999, which was a very large 
increase by historical standards. Although the robust economy, the expansion of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and increased child care subsidies in the 1990s 
also encouraged single mothers to leave the AFDC programme, many studies show 
that the 1996 welfare reform had positive net effects on the employment rate of single 
mothers (Blank 2002, Moffitt 2003, Grogger and Karoly 2005). Acs and Loprest 
(2001) conclude that the employment rate among welfare leavers is around 60% after 
exiting and that welfare leavers generally work full time. Moreover, around 
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three-quarters of welfare leavers were able to enter the job market at some point in the 
first year after leaving the programme and their hourly wage rates were above the 
minimum wage, approximately $7 to $8 per hour. 
3.2. Welfare programme substitution 
Waidmann et al. (1995) and Bound and Burkhauser (1999) argue that the decision 
to apply for a disability programme not only is purely a function of health but also 
includes the consideration of economic alternatives—whether work can be found or 
alternative programme eligibility. Research suggests that there has been some 
movement of both adults and children between public assistance programmes, with an 
overlap in potential populations, meaning people always choose the welfare 
programme that fits their best interests (Bound et al., 1998; Kubik, 1999; Loprest, 
1999; Garret and Glied, 2000). These studies imply that a welfare substitution effect 
may exist since welfare reform and it could thus be misleading to interpret the decline 
of the AFDC/TANF caseload as an equal-sized reduction in the total caseload of 
government assistance programmes. Among all government assistance programmes, 
SSI is the most feasible alternative for single mothers for the following reasons. 
The SSI programme is a means-tested federal programme that makes monthly 
payments to individuals who are aged 65 or older, blind, or disabled. 5 However, the 
SSI’s disability requirement is not strict and disabled candidates include both adults 
who have a work-limiting disability as well as children who fail to pursue 
age-appropriate activities. Compared with the AFDC/TANF programme, the SSI 
                                                             
5 The main comparison between SSI and AFDC/TANF is presented in the Table A.2. 
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programme generally pays higher benefits, with high costs of participation. The SSI 
application involves a time-consuming disability determination process that includes a 
medical evaluation.6 However, the SSI programme does not have work requirements 
or time limits on benefits and it is very likely to serve as an attractive alternative for 
those who leave the AFDC/TANF programme as AFDC/TANF becomes increasingly 
restrictive.  
In addition to incentives faced by individuals, I also expect states to have both 
political and budgetary incentives to shift AFDC families to the SSI programme. The 
TANF benefits are financed partially by the federal government and partially by the 
state, while SSI benefits are financed entirely by the federal government. Therefore, 
state governments are willing to shift AFDC recipients to the SSI programme to 
reduce their budgetary burden. In addition, with welfare reform, states have faced 
increasing political pressure from the federal government to reduce their AFDC 
caseload, which encourages states to shift AFDC recipients to the less controversial 
SSI programme. 
Even though the fairly objective disability definition for SSI eligibility may 
prevent welfare leavers from entering the programme, there are still two possible 
reasons why SSI caseloads could fluctuate. First, McGarry (1996) finds out that SSI 
take-up rates are considerably less than 100% and estimates that approximately 56% 
of elderly SSI eligible candidates are receiving SSI,7  implying that some SSI 
                                                             
6 See Lahiri, Vaughan, and Wixon (1995) for a detailed description of the disability determination 
process to apply for the SSI program. 
7 See Moffitt (1992) and Blank and Ruggles (1996) for more discussions about this ‘nonparticipating 
eligible’ phenomenon. 
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programme potential recipients do not apply for the SSI programme. Second, the 
self-reporting of disabilities is endogenous, meaning that individuals may change their 
disability status to apply for programmes such as SSI, given that they have no other 
choice (Schmidt and Sevak, 2003). 
There is evidence of similarities between AFDC and SSI recipients. Loprest and 
Acs (1995) point out the high prevalence of disability rates among AFDC recipients 
during the 1990s. The authors calculate that, depending on the data source, about 
16.6–20.1% of women receiving AFDC answered yes to the question ‘Do you have a 
physical, mental, or other health problem that limits the kind or amount of work you 
can do?’ Because both AFDC and SSI are means-tested programmes, recipients are 
also likely to be similar with regard to other characteristics, such as education and 
work experience (Schmidt and Sevak, 2003). 
Garrett and Glied (2000) find that the states that have the highest increases in 
AFDC benefits show lower increases in SSI caseloads than other states. Kubik (1999) 
finds that families eligible for more assistance from other programmes are less likely 
to apply for SSI and that states undergoing budgetary difficulties are more likely to 
experience increases in child SSI caseloads than in AFDC caseloads. Loprest (1999) 
suggests that 23% of nonworking welfare leavers were receiving SSI and Schmidt and 
Sevak (2003) find that female-headed households in states with a waiver are 21.6% 
more likely to receive SSI. 




Research about disconnectedness focuses on the increasing disconnected rate 
among single mothers in the early 2000s and the determinants of disconnectedness. 
However, few articles have linked welfare reform to the increasing disconnected rate. 
3.3.1. The rising disconnected rate among single mothers 
The definition of disconnected people varies across studies, but all of the 
definitions share common characteristics. Loprest (2011) summarizes that most of the 
researchers would consider a single mother who is unemployed and not receiving 
AFDC/TANF to be disconnected, although, to be defined as disconnected, the length 
of unemployment can vary from one month to one year. Some researchers would also 
consider those who receive less than a certain amount of AFDC/TANF benefits as not 
receiving welfare benefits.8 These definitions are conceptually similar and previous 
studies, whichever definitions they adopt, all document that some former 
AFDC/TANF recipients became disconnected after welfare reform. Using a national 
estimate of the National Survey of America’s Families, Loprest and Zedlewski (2006) 
note that 9.8% of former welfare recipients in 1999 and 13.8% in 2001 were 
disconnected. The disconnected rate experienced a large increase later on and around 
one-fifth of single mothers who left TANF in 2000 did not enter the job market or 
receive other government assistance, such as SSI, in 2002 (see Acs and Loprest, 2004). 
Evidence using state-level data show that around 13.4% of former TANF recipients 
were disconnected in Colorado in 2008 (Farrell, 2009), 23% were not working or 
                                                             
8 Some papers would also require single mother to not receive either SSI disability benefits or 
unemployment insurance in order to be disconnected. 
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receiving TANF in Ohio in 2001 (Brock et al., 2002), and 25% were disconnected in 
New Jersey in 2002 (Wood and Rangarajan, 2003). In addition, Turner, Danziger, and 
Seefeldt (2006) analyse the Women’s Employment Study and summarize that a small 
but growing percentage of women who received AFDC/TANF before the 1996 
welfare reform did not make a successful transition from welfare to work by the fall 
of 2003 in Michigan. The authors calculate that 12.5% of those on welfare in 1997 
were disconnected in 2003. Other studies focus on low-income disconnected families 
as a whole rather than consider former TANF recipients. Blank and Kovak (2008) 
argue that policy aimed to increase working incentives for low-income adults during 
the 1990s made assistance less available to those who could not find work and a 
growing group of single mothers reported that they were not working and did not 
receive public assistance benefits. Based on three different definitions of disconnect, 
the authors estimate that around 20–26.3% of low-income single mothers were 
disconnected during 2003–2005. Loprest and Nichols (2011) study the 2004 panel of 
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and suggest that the 
percentage of low-income single mothers who are disconnected has increased over the 
last 15 years. About one-eighth of low-income single mothers were disconnected in 
1996, but one-fifth, or approximately 1.2 million women, were disconnected in 2008. 
 
3.3.2 The economic well-being of disconnected single mothers 
Some research focuses on the change in the material well-being of disconnected 
single mothers after welfare reform and how they can survive with a low income. 
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Loprest and Zedlewski (2006) calculate that the average annual household income, 
which includes a spouse and cohabiting partners, for disconnected former TANF 
recipients was $6,178, compared with $17,681 for other former TANF recipients in 
2002, with 82% of disconnected low-income single-mother families living in poverty. 
Loprest and Nichols (2011) point out that around one-third of disconnected 
low-income single mothers treat child support as a main source of their income, 55% 
of disconnected former TANF recipients receive Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program benefits, 53% receive Medicaid, and 26% receive government housing 
assistance in 2008. Surprisingly, around half of disconnected families do not receive 
any of these benefits. Loprest and Zedlewski (2006) analyse the material hardship of 
disconnected former TANF recipients and show that they are not more likely to 
experience hardships such as missing rent or utility payments but are more likely to 
experience food insecurity compared with working former TANF recipients. The 
national data show that 66% of disconnected former recipients reported being food 
insecure compared to 55% of other former recipients in 2002. Zedlewski and Nelson 
(2003) argue that another source of support is friends and family members and find 
that 64% of disconnected single mothers reported at least occasionally receiving 
financial support from family members. 
 
3.3.3 Reason for becoming disconnected 
Loprest and Zedlewski (2006) estimate that two-thirds of disconnected former 
TANF recipients experience several barriers to work, including not working in the 
12 
past two years, having less than a high school education, having a child younger than 
one year old, speaking primarily Spanish, and having poor mental health or a health 
condition that limits work in 2002. These findings are confirmed by Loprest and 
Nichols (2011), who summarize that barriers to work among disconnected single 
mothers include little education, mental or physical health problems or disabilities, 
substance abuse, domestic violence, learning disabilities, criminal records, or the need 
to care for a disabled child or family member. The authors further estimate that 29% 
of disconnected low-income single mothers dropped out of high school in 2008, 
compared with 18% for all low-income single mothers, and disconnected single 
mothers are more likely to report a health problem (20% versus 13%). Turner, 
Danziger, and Seefeldt (2006) study former AFDC/TANF recipients in an urban 
county in Michigan and find that any one of the four most significant working 
barriers—a learning disability, physical limitation, no driver’s license, and alcohol 
dependence—would increase the probability of becoming disconnected by around 
7.5% and multiple barriers would have an even greater impact of 47.7%. Blank and 
Kovak (2008) analyse reasons for disconnectedness with the 2001 SIPP and conclude 
that around 57.5% of the disconnectedness starts because of an earning less than 
$2000, probably caused by job loss, and 14% of single mothers become disconnected 
because of a government benefit income of less than $1000, probably caused by the 
loss of welfare or SSI. Farrell (2009) shows that disconnected leavers in Colorado are 
more likely to leave because of reaching a time limit or ‘requirements or hassles’ than 
other leavers. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data sources and description 
I use data from three nationally representative surveys—the 1989–2007 March 
Current Population Survey (CPS), the 1990–2009 Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), and the 2003–2010 American Time Use Survey (ATUS)—to investigate 
government benefit programme substitution effects and disconnectedness. The 
nationally representative CPS dataset provides detailed economic and demographic 
information on individual and household levels each year and serves as one of the 
most important datasets for policy evaluation studies. Household members who have 
finished the CPS survey are randomly chosen to participant in the ATUS and answer 
questions about time use allocation among different activities, such as a job, 
housework, child care, and socializing. When linked to demographic characteristics 
from the CPS, the ATUS data can be employed to study the time allocation patterns of 
specific population groups, such as disconnected single mothers in my study. The 
PSID is a longitudinal survey that started in 1968 by interviewing around 4,800 
families to study dynamic demographic and economic behaviour. Detailed 
introductions of these surveys are available in the Appendix. I define single mothers 
as female heads of families that contain at least one child younger than 18 years. 
Similarly to previous studies, the sample consists of all single mothers aged 18 to 54. 
Since these three surveys are asking AFDC/TANF welfare recipients in the previous 
calendar year, the sample period extends from 1988 through 2006. 
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The study begins with a difference-in-difference (DID) analysis to identify any 
possible programme substitution effect after the 1996 welfare reform. Later on, I 
move to regression analysis to quantitatively measure the incremental probability of 
becoming disconnected due to welfare reform. The detailed methodologies are 
discussed below. 
4.2. DID analysis 
I follow the methodology of Schmidt and Sevak (2003) and extend the data to the 
post-reform period to check whether the government benefit programme substitution 
effect persists. 9 If a similar pattern can be obtained with the data after reform as what 
Schmidt and Sevak (2003) have found, then I am confident of concluding that some 
single mothers shift from the AFDC/TANF programme to the SSI programme, which 
makes the decline in the AFDC/TANF caseload less meaningful. To be specific, DID 
analysis controls for macroeconomic and demographic factors that influence 
treatment and control groups similarly but isolates the quantitative impact of what I 
am interested in—welfare reform—on single mothers in a straightforward way. In 
others words, I assume that the control group is less likely to be affected by the 
reform policy while the treatment group is heavily affected, other than that, the 
control and treatment groups are quite similar to each other. As long as the assumption 
holds, the difference between the changes in the SSI participation rate of the control 
and treatment groups is due only to welfare reform policy. 
                                                             
9 Here the sample size is restricted to only those 18–45 years old, to be consistent with Schmidt and 
Sevak (2003). 
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However, many policies changed during the 1990s and I may not able to find a 
perfect control group that behaves similarly to single mothers when facing different 
policies other than TANF. As a result, several different control groups are employed 
and if the conclusion is robust regardless of the control group, I will have greater 
confidence in the conclusion. The first control group consists of married mothers. 
Since SSI child cases increased greatly during the 1990s due to the changed rules 
about child eligibility, families with children may be affected differently from families 
without children. To control for SSI child policy I compare the effects of welfare 
reform only on women with children by treating married mothers as a control group. 
However, married mothers are also influenced by welfare policy aimed at two-parent 
families, such as the AFDC-UP programme, and since states were mandated to offer 
UP benefits beginning in 1990, the UP share of the total caseload has been increasing 
over this period. Because of these concerns, single women without children are also 
included to control for changes in welfare policy targeting two-parent families. In fact, 
the validity of using single women and married mothers as control groups is well 
documented in previous research (see Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Sullivan, 
2004). 
4.3. Logistic regression methodology 
The analysis on disconnectedness starts with a traditional methodology that uses a 
policy dummy variable and focuses on the cumulative effect of welfare reform10 on 
                                                             
10 The exact implementation dates of the waivers and the 1996 welfare reform are presented in the 
Table A.3. 
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the behaviour of single mothers (see Moffitt, 1999; Schoeni and Blank, 2000). 
Furthermore, I try to disaggregate the impact of time limit policy on single mothers by 
following Grogger (2004) and introduce an interaction between the time limit policy11 
dummy and a modified age variable. A logistic regression model would be used here 
to model the probability of a single mother becoming disconnected. 
As noted in the literature review, there are no official definitions of 
disconnectedness but different definitions give similar results. I implement 
disconnectedness definition proposed by Blank and Kovak (2008) which classifies 
disconnected single mothers as those who are not in school, report less than $2000 in 
annual wage earnings and less than $1000 in both AFDC/TANF income and 
household SSI income. These criteria are used by Blank and Kovak (2008) to 
calculate the 2005 disconnected rate; when I apply them to other years, I will adjust 
the threshold value by using the Consumer Price Index reported by the US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. 
I first estimate the logistic probability model 1: 
 
where     is the probability that the i th single mother in state s becomes 
disconnected at time t; istx  includes the mother’s demographic characteristics such 
as education level, age, race, and disability status; stm  includes state conditions such 
as unemployment rate, minimum wage, and maximum AFDC/TANF benefits payable 
to a family of three; isth  includes family attributes such as the number of children in 
                                                             
11 The exact implementation dates of time limit policy and welfare reform without a time limit policy 
are presented in the Table A.4. 
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the household and the age of the youngest child; and 1streform  and stwaiver  are 
dummy variables that equal the fraction of the year during which the reform or waiver, 
respectively, was in place or one after that year (see Moffitt, 1999; Schoeni and Blank, 
2000). The waiver indicator would be turned off after TANF is implemented in the 
state. 
Later I try to identify the effect of time limit policy separately by following 
Grogger (2004). Prior to the 1996 welfare reform, recipients could receive benefits as 
long as they satisfied the eligibility criteria, without any time constraints. A time limit 
policy provides recipients with an incentive not to receive AFDC/TANF welfare 
benefits and to become disconnected in order to conserve the benefits. Such a study is 
feasible because many states first implemented a welfare reform programme without 
time limit provisions and added a time limit policy later. Two dummy variables are 
employed to separately assess the effect of time limit policy and other welfare reform 
policy on disconnectedness. Practically, the additional time limit dummy that equals 
the fraction of the year during which time limits was imposed and equals one after 
that year, is incorporated into the model, and the reform dummy variable is modified 
so that it equals the fraction of the year during which any state-wide or nationwide 
welfare reform (waivers or TANF) was in place, and equal one after that year. 
Furthermore, I allow for age dependence in the effects of time limits, with an 
interaction between the time limit dummy and a modified age variable. Because most 
states impose a five-year time limit on welfare recipients, families without children 
less than 13 years old should not be affected by the time limit policy since they would 
18 
be ineligible for AFDC/TANF with all children older than 18 before the time limit is 
due. As a result, the interaction term would fully capture the impact of the time limit 





[Table A.3 Here] 
[Table A.4 Here] 
5. Existence of programme substitution  
I investigate the existence of programme substitution using DID analysis, and the 
results are presented in Table 1 which clearly shows that the sharp increase in the SSI 
participation rate for single mothers relative to single women and married mothers 
does not continue after the 1996 welfare reform. In 1992, only 3.46% of single 
mothers reported receiving SSI benefits and this number increased to 4.86% in 1996, 
an increase of 1.40%. During this period, the SSI participation rate of single women 
rose by only 0.27% and that number for married mothers was 0.41%. Column 10 and 
11 suggest that the increase in the SSI participation rate for single mothers is at least 
0.99% larger than that of control groups and I believe this 0.99% difference is 
significant enough to suggest the existence of programme substitution between 
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AFDC/TANF and SSI, given that less than 3.50% of single mothers were receiving 
SSI before states began to implement AFDC waiver policies. 
During 1996–2000, the SSI participation rates of all population groups 
experienced a slight decline. In particular, the decline in the SSI participation rate for 
single mothers was 0.73%, while those for single women and married mother were 
0.49% and 0.40%, respectively. DID analysis shows that the decline in the SSI 
participation rate for single mothers is larger than that for single women and married 
mothers by 0.24% and 0.33%, respectively, meaning single mothers were less likely 
to apply for SSI programme benefits since the 1996 welfare reform. Although the 
long-term effect analysis shows that the increase in the SSI participation rate for 
single mothers during 2000–2004 was larger than that for the control groups, the 
magnitude was too small to justify the existence of government benefit programme 
substitution after welfare reform. These findings therefore suggest that single mothers 
are not more likely to apply for SSI benefits compared with single women and 
married mothers since the 1996 welfare reform and programme substitution between 
SSI and AFDC/TANF does not exist. 
[Table 1 Here] 
6. Change in the number of disconnected single mothers 
6.1 A national picture of single mothers 
Figure 1 shows the change in AFDC/TANF participation rate, employment rate, 
and disconnected rate among single mothers during 1988–2006. In 1998, around 28% 
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of single mothers reported receiving AFDC/TANF benefits12 while 60% of single 
mothers reported working13 and 10% of single mothers were disconnected. The 
AFDC/TANF programme participation rate peaked at 30% in 1991 and began to 
decline when some states started to implement major AFDC waiver policies. At the 
same time, the employment rate of single mothers increased slightly, while the 
disconnected rate remained relatively stable. After the 1996 welfare reform, the 
AFDC/TANF participation rate continued to drop and the disconnected rate began to 
increase, although it experienced a sudden drop in 2002. Overall, the disconnected 
rate of single mothers increased from 11.46% during 1988–1992 to 16.23% during 
2001–2006, representing an increase of 4.77% in absolute terms, or 41.66% from the 
beginning level. 
Compared with connected single mothers, disconnected single mothers have low 
education levels and are more likely to be disabled. For example, only 7.1% of 
disconnected single mothers graduate from university, compared to 11.1% of 
connected single mothers, and around 16.3% of disconnected single mothers are 
disabled, compared with 6.2% of connected mothers. Other than education level and 
disability, disconnected single mother and single mothers are quite similar to each 
other. 
[Figure 1 Here] 
[Table 2 Here] 
                                                             
12 I define single mothers with an annual AFDC/TANF benefit larger than $1000 in 2005 dollars as 
receiving AFDC/TANF in order to be consistent with the definition of disconnectedness. 
13 I define single mothers with an annual income larger than $2000 in 2005 dollars as working in order 
to be consistent with the definition of disconnectedness. 
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6.2 Empirical results 
Table A.5 shows DID analysis of disconnected rate and the result is mixed. In 
from 1996 to 2000, the disconnected rate of single mothers dropped by 0.27% while 
that of single women rose by 0.95%. But during 2000-2004, the disconnected rate of 
single mothers rose by 4.66% while that of single women rise by 1.66%. Tables 3 and 
4 summarize the regression results of the logistic model. The result of model 1, using 
Blank’s (2000) definition of welfare reform and waiver dummies suggests that 
welfare waivers and reform cannot explain the increase in the disconnected rate 
among single mothers during 1988–2006. The coefficient of waivers is -0.034 and 
that of reform is -0.059, implying that waiver policies and the 1996 reform policy 
would make single mothers 0.38% and 0.67% less likely, respectively, to become 
disconnected, which is contrary to my predictions. However, the coefficients are 
statistically insignificant and the relatively small average marginal effect suggests that 
the economic meaning of reform policy is also insignificant compared with other 
explanatory variables such as education level and disability. So the best interpretation 
would be that the 1996 welfare reform and waiver policies before 1996 have no effect 
on the probability of becoming disconnected. Among all control variables, disability 
is the most important factor in explaining why a single mother chooses to be 
disconnected. A disabled single mother is 11.99% more likely to become disconnected 
compared with one without disability. This finding is expected, because disabled 
single mothers have difficulty entering the job market and single mothers are unlikely 
to switch to the SSI programme after they leave the AFDC/TANF programme. The 
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second important factor affecting the probability of disconnectedness is education 
level. All else being equal, single mothers with a high school degree are 4.78% less 
likely to become disconnected compared with those without a high school degree. 
Moreover, if single mothers receive some college education, they have an additional 
probability of 4.47% of being connected. The negative and significant coefficient of 
the race dummy variable suggests that black single mothers are less likely to become 
disconnected compared with white ones, for reasons that will be explained later. Other 
control variables related to individual and family characteristics have little effect on 
the probability of disconnectedness. An increase of 1% in the state unemployment rate 
only increases the probability of disconnectedness by 0.75%. 
[Table A.5 Here] 
[Table 3 Here] 
[Table 4 Here] 
6.3 Why black single mothers are less likely to be disconnected 
The results above suggest that black single mothers are 2.68% less likely to 
become disconnected, which is contrary to intuitive expectations. In general, black 
people are believed to be the most disadvantaged group in the United States and I 
therefore expect black single mothers to be more likely to be disconnected from the 
job market and government benefit programmes than white single mothers. However, 
the comparison between black and white single mothers in Table 5 shows that this is 
not the case, since the disconnected rate among black single mothers is lower than 
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that of white single mothers. Although black single mothers are less likely to be 
employed, some of them become connected through participating in welfare 
programmes. Furthermore, I run two additional regressions by changing the 
dependent variable in model 1 to employment and a government benefit recipient 
dummy. The result suggests black single mothers are 3.79% less likely to be 
employed, 6.65% more likely to receive AFDC/TANF benefits, and 1.43% more 
likely to receive SSI benefits. Therefore, black single mothers are less likely to be 
disconnected compared with white single mothers through receiving welfare benefits. 
[Table 5 Here] 
6.4 The separate effects of time limit policy on disconnectedness 
The results of model 2 in Table 3 show the effect of time limit policy on the 
probability of disconnectedness depends on the age of the youngest child in the family. 
If the age of the youngest child is equal to or greater than 13, single mothers will not 
be affected by the time limit policy. If the age of the youngest child is under 13, single 
mothers are more likely to become disconnected after the state implements a time 
limit policy. Moreover, the younger the child is, the higher the probability of the 
mother becoming disconnected. For example, a single mother with a youngest child 
aged one is 2.52% more likely to become disconnected than one with a youngest child 
aged 13 or over after a time limit policy is imposed. Before a time limit policy is 
imposed, a single mother with a child aged 10 is eligible for AFDC/TANF benefit for 
up to eight years, until her child reaches 18. When the state implements a time limit 
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policy, this single mother is bound by the time limit policy and needs to allocate five 
years welfare recipient among eight eligible years; as a result, some unemployed 
single mothers will not apply for AFDC/TANF in order to conserve their benefits. 
 
7. Change in the well-being of disconnected single mothers 
I study the food consumption and time allocation of disconnected single mothers 
to evaluate their long-term well-being after the 1996 welfare reform.  
7.1 Food consumption 
The PSID’s food consumption data—the sum of food spending at home, food 
spending away from home, and food stamps received—refer to household 
consumption level and I use an equivalent scale to calculate the individual level so as 
to compare different-sized families. 14 Figure 2 shows how single mothers have 
changed their total consumption level compared with control groups after welfare 
reform. Overall, single mothers spend less on food compared with single women and 
married mothers before and after reform. Among single mothers, disconnected single 
mothers spend less than connected single mothers, suggesting that disconnected single 
mothers are the most disadvantaged group in terms of food consumption. But the 
difference in consumption level between connected and disconnected single mothers 
is too small to indicate that disconnected single mothers are facing a food insecurity 
                                                             
14 Scale value = (number of adults + 0.7*number of children)0.7, this is a standard scale that follows 
National Research Council(1995). 
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problem. Besides, disconnected single mothers spent $2,324 on food per year during 
1990–1991 and $2,203 per year during 1998–2002, suggesting there is no large 
change in the food consumption level since the 1996 welfare reform. 
[Figure 2 Here] 
A study of the different components of food consumption provides a clear picture 
about how disconnected single mothers have changed their food consumption pattern 
over time. Food stamps, which account for 21.04% of total food consumption for 
connected mothers and 39.34% for disconnected single mothers, are one of the 
important sources for single mothers, especially disconnected ones, to support their 
daily life. Food stamps received fluctuated during 1990–2009, but single mothers 
were able to adjust spending on food at home and away from home to smooth food 
consumption over time. I find no significant difference in spending patterns between 
disconnected single mothers and control groups and all population groups tend to 
increase their spending on food away from home and decrease their spending at home. 
To conclude, from the study of food consumption, I argue that the decline in the food 
consumption of disconnected single mothers is too small to suggest that they face a 
food insecurity problem since the 1996 welfare reform. 
[Figure 3 Here] 
[Figure 4 Here] 
[Figure 5 Here] 
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7.2 Time allocation 
To study the time allocation of disconnected single mothers, I follow Aguiar and 
Hurst’s (2007) definition of time use categories. Basically, four different time 
categories are defined: market work, non-market work, child care, and leisure. 
Detailed descriptions of these four activities are available in the table A.6. It should be 
noted that time spent on child care is not included in the measurement of time spent 
on non-market work because time spent on child care has both a non-market 
production and a leisure component. For example, individuals may value a walk with 
their children more than a sports game with friends sometimes but may also pay a 
baby sister to take care of their children when they go out with friends. 
[Table A.6 Here] 
Table 6 summarizes time allocation during 2003–2010. Compared with connected 
control groups, disconnected single mothers spend less time on market work because 
they are disconnected from the job market. On average, they spend 8.65 hours per 
week on direct market work compared with 26.33 hours for connected single mothers. 
They also spend little time on job searching, suggesting disconnected single mothers 
are unwilling to leave their disconnected status through employment. However, 
disconnected single mothers spend 4.01 hours more on non-market work compared 
with connected single mothers, this difference coming mainly from home production. 
More specifically, disconnected single mothers spend 15.31 hours per week on home 
production chores while connected single mother spend 10.62 hours. The increase in 
time spent on non-market work can be considered an improvement in the living 
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standard of disconnected single mother families, which I believe is beneficial for both 
mothers and children.  
As for child care activity, disconnected single mothers spend 2.11 hours more per 
week on total child care compared with connected single mothers, the difference 
mainly coming from primary child care. Disconnected single mothers do not spend 
much time on educational child care and one of the possible reasons is that their low 
education level keeps them from reading to their children or helping them with 
homework. Not surprisingly, disconnected single mothers spend more time on leisure 
compared with control groups. On average, disconnected single mothers spend 39.70 
hours per week on leisure 1, which includes entertainment, social activities, and 
relaxing and recreational child care, while that number for connected single mothers 
is 30.50 hours per week, with most of the difference coming from single mothers’ 
individual entertainment activities.15 This result suggests that disconnected single 
mothers prefer to allocate spare time on the least productive activity, individual 
leisure, rather than child care. 
[Table 6 Here] 
Table 7 shows that leisure inequality between disconnected single mothers and 
control groups has grown, since disconnected single mothers allocated increasing 
amounts of time to individual leisure from 2003 to 2009. During 2003–2006, 
disconnected single mothers spent 113.91 hours per week on leisure 3 and this 
number increased to 119.82 hours per week during 2007–2010, while connected 
                                                             
15 Disconnected single mothers only spent 0.24 hours more per week on recreational child care than 
connected single mothers. 
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single mother reduced their time on leisure 3 from 104.38 to 102.91 hours per week. 
At the same time, disconnected single mothers reduced time spent on both market 
work and non-market work. During 2003–2006, disconnected single mothers spent 
11.86 hours per week on total market work and this number declined to 9.44 during 
2007–2010, while connected single mothers, on the contrary, increased time spent on 
total market work by 1.81 hours per week. In addition, all of the groups reduced time 
spent on total non-market work and the decline of 6.31 hours per week for 
disconnected single mothers was the largest in terms of both absolute value and 
relative value, suggesting that disconnected single mothers did not pay much attention 
to improving their living standards recently. 
[Table 7 Here] 
In summary, during 2003–2010, disconnected single mothers spent more hours 
than connected single mothers on productive activities such as total market work and 
child care, which are supposed to improve the living standards of disconnected 
single-mother families and increase the utility of both mothers and children. However, 
most spare time was spent on the least productive activity, individual leisure. The 
leisure inequality has widened recently because over time disconnected single 
mothers have reduced time spent on work (both market and non-market work) and 
increased time spent on leisure. 
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8. Discussion and Policy Implications 
My research points out that the programme substitution effect which Schmidt and 
Sevak (2003) suggest may not exist after the 1996 welfare reform, so the decline in 
the AFDC/TANF caseload may be considered as an equal-sized reduction in the total 
caseload of government assistance programmes. One of the objectives of the 1996 
welfare reform is to reduce the federal budget burden through a decline in the 
AFDC/TANF caseload and this objective has been achieved, given that people left 
AFDC/TANF programme did not enter into other government programmes. However, 
policy makers should pay attention to the side effects of the 1996 welfare reform on 
the disconnectedness of single mothers. My research suggests that the five-year time 
limit policy seems to be responsible for part of the increase in the disconnected rate 
among single mothers and that disconnected single mothers do not allocate their time 
effectively, spending most of their spare time on individual leisure rather than 
productive activities such as housework or child care. More researches should be done 
to study the reason of disconnectedness, and more policies are desired to help 
disconnected single mothers leave their disconnected status and minimize the negative 
impacts of welfare policies. 
It should be noted that my study may suffer from an underreporting problem with 
survey data from the CPS, PSID, and ATUS. Meyer et al. (2009) conclude that the 
underreporting problem is common and has increased over time in five major 
household surveys, including the CPS and PSID. Based on their research, the average 
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reporting rate of AFDC/TANF during 1992-2007 in CPS was 61.3%, and the 
reporting rate declined from 72.1% in 1992 to 52.7% in 2007. The reasons for 
underreporting in surveys vary. Interviewees may simply forget the amount of 
benefits they receive or get confused about the name of a benefit programme. The 
stigma of government programme participation and the desire to reduce the interview 
burden can also lead to underreporting. If some of those who receive welfare but not 
report are not working or taking SSI, I will therefore define them as disconnected and 
overstate the disconnected rate among single mothers. More importantly, the increase 
in disconnected rate of single mothers may partially due to the increasing 
under-reporting over time. Although there is no easy way to solve the underreporting 
problem, further studies with the correction of under-reporting are desired to obtain a 
better estimate of the effect of the 1996 welfare reform on single mothers16. 
The research can also be improved with the use of panel data. Like most previous 
studies, I use cross-sectional CPS data to carry out the regression analysis in this 
study; however, this methodology fails to incorporate some person-specific 
unobservable factors. For example, a single mother who is ashamed to take 
government benefits may be consistently reluctant to apply for welfare and is more 
likely to become disconnected. To solve this problem, researchers can employ a fixed 
effect logistic model with a panel data to control for these time-invariant individual 
characteristics. Moreover, researchers can employ a more general disconnected 
                                                             
16 Meyer et al. (2009) suggest that the disconnected rate among single mothers had risen by a factor of eight 
between 1990 and 2005, which is more serious than what Blank and Kovak (2008) calculate. 
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definition which requires disconnected single mothers not to receive food stamp, 
general assistances and other government benefits. 
 
9. Conclusion 
This paper evaluates the effect of the 1996 welfare reform on single mothers, 
paying attention to two main issues. First, it examines the existence of programme 
substitution between SSI and AFDC/TANF after the reform. Second, it examines the 
prevalence of single mothers becoming disconnected from government assistance and 
the job market since the reform. I find that there is no programme substitution effect 
between AFDC/TANF and SSI, so the decline in the AFDC/TANF caseload from 4 
million in 1990 to 2.5 million in 1999 may be considered to be an equal-sized 
reduction in the number of the total caseload of government assistance programmes. 
More importantly, single mothers who are bound by the five-year time limit may be 
more likely to become disconnected. For example, single mothers with a youngest 
child aged one are 2.5% more likely to become disconnected than those with a 
youngest child aged 13 and above. 
On one hand, disconnected single mothers are unlikely to face a food insecurity 
problem since they experienced only a slight decline of $121 per year in food 
consumption since welfare reform. On the other hand, disconnected single mothers do 
not allocate time effectively. Most of their spare time is spent on the least productive 
activity, individual leisure. In addition, leisure inequality between disconnected 
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mothers and connected single mothers has widened from 9.53 hours per week during 
2003-2006 to 16.91 hours per week during 2007-2010 because over time disconnected 
single mothers have reduced time spent on work (both market and non-market work) 
and increased time spent on leisure. 
While the 1996 welfare reform has been successful in reducing the AFDC/TANF 
caseload, its side effects on the disconnectedness of single mothers should also be 
considered and further policy should be implemented to help them leave their 
disconnected status. 
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Figure 1: The Disconnected Rate of Single Mothers, 1988-2006 
Note: Data from the 1989-2007 March Current Population Survey. Disconnected single mothers refer 
to those who are not in school; report less than $2000 in annual wage earning and less than $1000 in 
both AFDC/TANF and SSI. Employed single mothers refer to those who report more than $2000 in 
annual wage earning. AFDC/TANF recipients refer to those who report more than $1000 in 
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Figure 5: The Comparison of Food Spending away from Home between Single Mothers and 
Control Groups 
 
Note: Data tabulated from the 1990-2010 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. All consumption figures 
are referring to individual annual food expenditure and are expressed in 1995 dollars using the 
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Note: Data tabulated from the 1989-2007 March Current Population Survey. The sample consists of single mothers, single women and married mothers aged 18-45. Standard 
errors of mean are in parentheses. All means and standard deviations are weighted. 
Table 1: SSI Program Participation Rate and DID Estimates, by Time Period 
  Single mothers Single women Married mothers Difference-in-Difference 
 
T0 T1 (2)-(1) T0 T1 (5)-(4) T0 T1 (8)-(7) (3)-(6) (3)-(9) 
 Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Before waiver 
(T0=1988,T1=1992) 2.07% 3.46% 1.38% 1.81% 2.90% 1.09% 0.41% 0.60% 0.19% 0.30% 1.19% 
 
(0.25%) (0.30%) (0.38%) (0.23%) (0.25%) (0.34%) (0.07%) (0.08%) (0.10%) (0.51%) (0.40%) 
Waiver 
(T0=1992,T1=1996) 3.46% 4.86% 1.40% 2.90% 3.17% 0.27% 0.60% 1.00% 0.41% 1.13% 0.99% 
 
(0.30%) (0.36%) (0.47%) (0.25%) (0.27%) (0.37%) (0.08%) (0.10%) (0.13%) (0.59%) (0.48%) 
Reform 
(T0=1996,T1=2000) 4.86% 4.12% -0.73% 3.17% 2.67% -0.49% 1.00% 0.60% -0.40% -0.24% -0.33% 
 
(0.36%) (0.36%) (0.51%) (0.27%) (0.26%) (0.37%) (0.10%) (0.09%) (0.13%) (0.63%) (0.53%) 
After reform 
(T0=2000,T1=2004) 4.12% 4.36% 0.24% 2.67% 2.76% 0.09% 0.60% 0.58% -0.02% 0.15% 0.25% 
  (0.36%) (0.28%) (0.46%) (0.26%) (0.23%) (0.35%) (0.09%) (0.07%) (0.11%) (0.58%) (0.47%) 
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Table 2: Demographic Statistics of Single Mothers Aged 18-54 in the CPS 
Variables Disconnected single mother Connected single mothers 
Age 32.642 32.127 
 
(9.562) (8.779) 
Race (Black=1) 0.304 0.336 
 
(0.460) (0.472) 
High graduate 0.683 0.808 
 
(0.465) (0.394) 
Some college 0.297 0.436 
 
(0.457) (0.496) 
Bachelor 0.071 0.111 
 
(0.258) (0.314) 
Disabled 0.163 0.062 
 
(0.369) (0.241) 
Num of child 1.762 1.707 
 
(1.002) (0.956) 
Age of youngest child 8.529 8.435 
 
(5.151) (5.142) 
N 4205 26626 
Note: Data from the 1989-2007 March Current Population Survey. All mean and standard deviation are 
weighted. Disconnected single mothers refer to those who are not in school; report less than $2000 in 
annual wage earning and less than $1000 in both AFDC/TANF and SSI. All threshold values are 
expressed in 2005 dollars. 
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Table 3: Estimates of the Effects of the 1996 Welfare Reform and Time Limit 
Policy on Disconnectedness 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Age 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Race (Black=1) -0.238*** -0.237*** -0.243*** 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
High graduate -0.424*** -0.424*** -0.424*** 
 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Some college -0.397*** -0.397*** -0.397*** 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Bachelor -0.107 -0.107 -0.107 
 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
Disabled 1.063*** 1.062*** 1.062*** 
 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Num of child 0.050** 0.050** 0.049** 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age of youngest child 0.001 0.001 0.011* 
 
(0.003) (0.003 ) (0.006) 
State unemployment rate 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
State minimum wage 0.028 0.025 0.026 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Maximum AFDC/TANF 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
















Time limit * age* 
  
-0.019** 






(0.117) (0.117 ) 
Pseudo R2 0.046  0.046  0.047  
N= 30831  30831  30831  
Note: Data from the 1989-2007 March Current Population Survey. Column (1) is the result of model 1 
and Column (3) is the result of model 2. Column (2) is a simple version of model 2 which does not 
include the interaction of the time limit dummy and modified age variable.  All regressions include 
state and year dummies. Reform1 measures the effect of TANF programme, Reform2 measures the 
effect of welfare reform policy (waivers or reform) except time limit policy.      
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Being Disconnected  
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Age 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 
    Race (Black=1) -2.68% -2.68% -2.67% 
    High graduate -4.78% -4.78% -4.78% 
    Some college -4.47% -4.47% -4.48% 
    Bachelor -1.21% -1.21% -1.21% 
    Disabled 11.99% 11.98% 11.98% 
    Num of child 0.56% 0.56% 0.55% 
    Age of youngest child 0.01% 0.01% 0.13% 
    State unemployment rate 0.75% 0.79% 0.79% 
    State minimum wage 0.32% 0.28% 0.29% 
    Maximum AFDC/TANF 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
    Waiver -0.38% 
  
    Reform1 -0.67% 
  
    Time limit 
 
2.07% 0.97% 
    Time limit * age* 
  
-0.21% 
    Reform2   -0.46% -0.49% 
Note: Data from the 1989-2007 March Current Population Survey. Column (1) is the result of model 1 
and Column (3) is the result of model 2. Column (2) is a simple version of model 2 which does not 
include the interaction of the time limit dummy and modified age variable. Figures here refer to the 
average Marginal Effects (AMES). Reform1 measures the effect of TANF programme, Reform2 
measures the effect of welfare reform policy (waivers or TANF) except time limit policy.   
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Table 5: The Comparison between Black and White Single Mothers  




participation rate Employment rate 
Year White Black White Black White Black White Black 
1988 12.4% 7.6% 21.5% 36.8% 1.7% 1.5% 67.0% 56.1% 
1989 12.9% 11.1% 18.6% 32.8% 1.4% 2.3% 69.7% 56.3% 
1990 11.3% 7.9% 24.0% 36.4% 2.0% 4.8% 66.5% 55.6% 
1991 12.0% 9.0% 24.6% 38.2% 1.8% 3.4% 65.7% 55.2% 
1992 12.3% 13.1% 24.3% 38.2% 2.7% 5.6% 65.0% 50.3% 
1993 10.5% 10.9% 23.0% 35.9% 4.0% 4.4% 66.6% 54.7% 
1994 12.8% 12.9% 23.2% 33.8% 2.9% 7.4% 66.9% 52.7% 
1995 10.2% 9.9% 19.1% 36.9% 3.5% 6.8% 71.3% 54.7% 
1996 11.8% 10.7% 18.1% 27.5% 3.7% 4.9% 70.1% 64.5% 
1997 12.9% 8.8% 15.5% 21.8% 4.0% 6.6% 71.5% 70.2% 
1998 13.4% 14.2% 12.9% 22.6% 3.1% 4.5% 74.6% 67.4% 
1999 13.0% 15.1% 9.6% 17.8% 2.5% 3.9% 76.8% 68.2% 
2000 13.3% 12.2% 7.7% 11.0% 2.2% 7.7% 77.5% 73.3% 
2001 17.1% 12.5% 6.4% 10.2% 2.5% 6.5% 73.9% 73.5% 
2002 14.6% 15.8% 6.4% 7.1% 3.0% 6.9% 75.6% 71.2% 
2003 15.8% 15.2% 7.7% 9.9% 2.8% 3.4% 73.5% 68.2% 
2004 16.5% 12.7% 5.2% 11.8% 3.5% 5.3% 74.3% 69.5% 
2005 16.9% 15.4% 6.5% 9.7% 3.5% 5.7% 71.6% 70.0% 
2006 17.8% 14.3% 4.3% 9.9% 3.5% 5.9% 73.2% 69.1% 
Notes: Data tabulated from the 1989-2007 March Current Population Survey. Disconnected single 
mothers refer to those who are not in school; report less than $2000 in annual wage earning and less 
than $1000 in both AFDC/TANF and SSI. Employed single mothers refer to those who report more 
than $2000 in annual wage earning. AFDC/TANF recipients refer to those who report more than $1000 
in AFDC/TANF benefit. SSI recipients refer to those who report more than $1000 in SSI benefit. All 
values are expressed in 2005 dollars. 
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Table 6: Time Allocation to Major Activity Categories, Hours per week, 2003-2010 










Market work         
Direct market work 8.65  26.33  29.47  20.17  
  
(1.55) (0.94) (0.81) (0.42) 
Job searching 0.33  0.45  0.30  0.09  
  
(0.18) (0.12) (0.08) (0.02) 
Total 10.57  28.91  32.67  21.98  
  
(1.64) (1.00) (0.87) (0.45) 
Non-market work     
Home production 15.31  10.62  7.69  15.71  
  
(1.25) (0.45) (0.33) (0.25) 
Obtaining goods 6.69  6.67  6.89  8.68  
   
(0.77) (0.37) (0.34) (0.21) 
Total  23.94  19.93  17.82  27.90  
  
(1.57) (0.66) (0.55) (0.35) 
Child care     
Primary 7.02  5.28  0.85  7.50  
  
(0.79) (0.27) (0.14) (0.16) 
Educational 0.57  0.44  0.03  0.74  
  
(0.20) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) 
Recreational 1.97  1.73  0.27  3.22  
  
(0.39) (0.19) (0.06) (0.13) 
Total 9.56  7.45  1.16  11.46  
  
(0.97) (0.35) (0.16) (0.23) 
Leisure     
Leisure 1 39.70  30.50  33.62  29.35  
  
(1.80) (0.75) (0.68) (0.34) 
Leisure 2 109.47  97.92  100.74  93.35  
  
(2.11) (0.89) (0.80) (0.41) 
Leisure 3 117.06  103.64  101.62  101.59  
  (2.03) (0.89) (0.80) (0.41) 
N 343 1811 2559 5327 
Note: Tabulated from the linked data of the 2003-2010 American Time Use Survey and the March 
Current Population Survey. Standard errors of mean are in parentheses. All mean and standard 
deviation are weighted. See appendix for detailed description of activities.
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Table 7: Change of Time Allocation to Major Activity Categories, Hours per Week 
























    
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (5)-(1) (6)-(2) (7)-(3) (8)-(4) 
Market work 
            
Direct market work 10.94  25.64  30.37  19.64  6.65  27.01  28.66  20.72  -4.29  1.37  -1.71  1.08  
  
(2.27) (1.29) (1.09) (0.57) (2.05) (1.37) (1.18) (0.62) (3.06) (1.88) (1.61) (0.84) 
Job searching 0.12  0.33  0.35  0.07  0.51  0.57  0.26  0.12  0.39  0.25  -0.08  0.05  
  
(0.09) (0.15) (0.11) (0.03) (0.37) (0.19) (0.10) (0.04) (0.38) (0.24) (0.15) (0.05) 
Total 11.86  28.00  33.71  21.38  9.44  29.81  31.73  22.60  -2.42  1.81  -1.99  1.22  
  
(2.39) (1.37) (1.18) (0.61) (2.18) (1.47) (1.27) (0.67) (3.24) (2.01) (1.74) (0.91) 
Non-market work 
            
Home production 16.97  10.37  7.79  16.18  13.87  10.87  7.61  15.23  -3.10  0.51  -0.18  -0.95  
  
(1.77) (0.65) (0.45) (0.34) (1.74) (0.61) (0.48) (0.36) (2.48) (0.89) (0.66) (0.50) 
Obtaining goods 8.24  7.22  7.02  9.36  5.34  6.13  6.78  7.99  -2.90  -1.08  -0.24  -1.37  
  
(1.19) (0.53) (0.46) (0.29) (0.93) (0.52) (0.48) (0.30) (1.51) (0.74) (0.67) (0.41) 
Total 27.31  20.51  17.97  29.24  21.00  19.35  17.68  26.54  -6.31  -1.16  -0.28  -2.70  
  
(2.23) (0.96) (0.74) (0.48) (2.13) (0.90) (0.79) (0.51) (3.09) (1.31) (1.08) (0.70) 
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Table 7 ( Continued ) 
    2003-2006 2007-2010 Difference 
  
Disconnected 














 mothers     
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (5)-(1) (6)-(2) (7)-(3) (8)-(4) 
Child care 
            
Primary 7.59  5.38  0.79  7.47  6.52  5.17  0.91  7.52  -1.07  -0.20  0.12  0.05  
  
(1.21) (0.36) (0.14) (0.23) (0.97) (0.40) (0.24) (0.24) (1.55) (0.54) (0.28) (0.33) 
Educational 0.69  0.40  0.03  0.75  0.46  0.49  0.03  0.73  -0.23  0.09  0.00  -0.02  
  
(0.33) (0.08) (0.02) (0.06) (0.21) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.39) (0.12) (0.04) (0.10) 
Recreational 1.30  1.75  0.21  3.08  2.56  1.71  0.33  3.37  1.26  -0.04  0.11  0.28  
  
(0.44) (0.24) (0.07) (0.16) (0.65) (0.31) (0.09) (0.20) (0.79) (0.39) (0.11) (0.26) 
Total 9.58  7.53  1.04  11.31  9.54  7.38  1.27  11.62  -0.05  -0.15  0.23  0.31  
 




         
Leisure 1 35.75  30.74  32.52  29.51  43.16  30.27  34.61  29.19  7.40  -0.47  2.09  -0.32  
  
(2.43) (1.03) (0.90) (0.46) (2.61) (1.09) (1.01) (0.52) (3.57) (1.50) (1.36) (0.69) 
Leisure 2 105.63  98.60  99.70  93.32  112.84  97.24  101.67  93.38  7.21  -1.36  1.97  0.05  
  
(2.81) (1.22) (1.05) (0.54) (3.10) (1.31) (1.21) (0.61) (4.18) (1.79) (1.60) (0.82) 
Leisure 3 113.91  104.38  100.52  101.55  119.82  102.91  102.61  101.63  5.91  -1.47  2.09  0.08  
  
(2.68) (1.22) (1.05) (0.55) (3.02) (1.30) (1.21) (0.60) (4.03) (1.79) (1.60) (0.82) 
N 180 985 1364 2939 163 826 1195 2388         
Note: Tabulated from the linked data of the 2003-2010 American Time Use Survey and the March Current Population Survey. Standard errors of mean are in parentheses. All 
mean and standard deviation are weighted. See appendix for detailed description of activities.
44 
Appendix: Data 
a) Current Population Survey 
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a cross-sectional household survey sponsored jointly by the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor statistics (BLS) and serves as an important source of labor force statistics in the United States. The CPS began in 1940 and 
approximately 60,000 sample households are selected by a multistage stratified statistical sampling scheme each year. A household is 
interviewed for 4 successive months, and returned to the sample for 4 months after not being interviewed for 8 months. The CPS asks questions 
about the employment status of each member in the household and also collects numerous demographic data in supplemental questions. An adult 
member of each household provides information for all members in that household. These data are the source of the annual Census Bureau report 
on income, poverty, and health insurance coverage. 
 
b) The Panel Study of Income Dynamics  
45 
The PSID, conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, is the longest running longitudinal household survey in 
the United States. It began in 1968 with a nationally representative sample of 5,000 families in the United States and continuously collected data 
covering education, disability, marriage, childbearing, food consumption employment, income, government benefit recipients, and numerous 
other topics. Families were interviewed each year until 1997 and the survey changed to be biannual after that. While the PSID collects data about 
circumstance of the family and all individuals in the family, the greatest level of detail is for adults heading the family.  
 
c) 2003-2010 American Time Use Survey 
The American Time Use Survey (ATUS) includes time-use information collected from more than 112,000 interviewees from 2003 to 2010 
and is the only federal survey providing nation-wide representative estimates of how, where, and with whom Americans spend their time, from 
market activities and nonmarket activities. The individuals chosen for participation in the ATUS are selected randomly from households in the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) and all of the ATUS interviews are administered by telephone. Each ATUS respondent provides detailed 
information on his or her activities during a designated 24-hour period. In 2003, 20,720 usable ATUS time diaries were collected, and that 
46 
number decreased to about 14,000 in 2004 because of budget constraints. The time-use data files can be linked to the CPS to study the time use 
trend of different population subgroups over time. 
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 Table A. 1: Main Comparison of the AFDC and TANF Programs 
Items  AFDC  TANF 
Eligibility Children deprived of 
support of one parent or 
children in low-income 
two-parent families 
 Children in low-income 
families as designated by state 
Financing Matching grant  Block grant 
Time limits None  Up to 60 months lifetime (20 % 
exempt) 
Asset limits Federal limits  None 
Income limits Family income cannot 




Required to participate in 
JOBS which provided single 
mothers with necessary 
employment training 
 50 % of single mother 
recipients were required to 
work 30 hours per week 
Sanctions Sanctions, although present, 
had never been enforced 
aggressively 
 Temporary or permanent 
withdrawal of benefits for 
failure to comply with work and 
other requirements 
Form of Aid Almost exclusively cash 
payment 
 States free to use funds for 
service and non-cash benefits 
Benefit levels At states option  At states option 
Source: Burke (1996) 
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Table A. 2: Main Comparison of the SSI and TANF Program 
Item  SSI  TANF 
Financing  Federal government  Federal and state government  
Eligibility  Aged, blind or disabled 
Low-income families with at least one 
child under 18 
Time limits  None Up to 60 months lifetime (20 % exempt) 
Work 
requirements  None 
50 % of single mother recipients 
required to work 30 hours per week  




































Table A. 3: Implementation Dates of Welfare Reform Policy 
State 










Arizona 11-1-95 10-1-96 
Arkansas 7-1-94 7-1-97 





Connecticut 1-1-96 10-1-96 
Delaware 10-1-95 3-10-97 






Georgia 1-1-94 1-1-97 




Illinois 11-23-93 7-1-97 
Indiana 5-1-95 10-1-96 













Maryland 3-1-96 12-9-96 
Massachusetts 11-1-95 9-30-96 




Mississippi 10-1-95 10-1-96 
Missouri 6-1-95 12-1-96 
Montana 2-1-96 2-1-97 

































Table A.3. (Continued) 
South Dakota 6-1-94 12-1-96 
Tennessee 9-1-96 10-1-96 
Texas 6-1-96 11-5-96 
Utah 1-1-93 10-1-96 
Vermont 7-1-94 9-20-96 
Virginia 7-1-95 2-1-97 
Washington 1-1-96 1-10-97 
West Virginia 2-1-96 1-11-97 
Wisconsin 1-1-96 9-30-96 
Wyoming   1-1-97 
Notes: Crouse(1999), the format is mm-dd-yy. Column (1) refers to the date when the earliest waivers implemented, column (2) refers to the date when the nation-wide 



































Table A. 4: Implementation Dates of Time Limit Policy 
State Waivers or TANF 
(1) 
Time limit policy 
(2) 
Alabama 11-15-96 11-15-96 
Alaska 7-1-97 7-1-97 
Arizona 11-1-95 11-1-95 
Arkansas 7-1-94 7-1-97 
California 12-1-92 1-1-98 
Colorado 7-1-97 7-1-97 
Connecticut 1-1-96 1-1-96 
Delaware 10-1-95 10-1-95 
Dist. of Columbia 3-1-97 3-1-97 
Florida 10-1-96 10-1-96 
Georgia 1-1-94 1-1-97 
Hawaii 2-1-97 2-1-97 
Idaho 7-1-97 7-1-97 
Illinois 11-23-93 2-1-96 
Indiana 5-1-95 7-1-95 
Iowa 10-1-93 10-1-93 
Kansas 10-1-96 10-1-96 
Kentucky 10-18-96 10-18-96 
Louisiana 1-1-97 1-1-97 
Maine 11-1-96 11-1-96 
Maryland 3-1-96 12-9-96 
54 
Massachusetts 11-1-95 9-30-96 
Michigan 10-1-92 9-30-96 
Minnesota 7-1-97 7-1-97 
Mississippi 10-1-95 7-1-97 
Missouri 6-1-95 12-1-96 
Montana 2-1-96 2-1-97 
Nebraska 10-1-95 10-1-95 
Nevada 12-3-96 12-3-96 
New Hampshire 10-1-96 10-1-96 
New Jersey 10-1-92 7-1-97 
New Mexico 7-1-97 7-1-97 
New York 11-1-97 11-1-97 
North Carolina 7-1-96 7-1-96 
North Dakota 7-1-97 7-1-97 
Ohio 7-1-96 10-1-96 
Oklahoma 10-1-96 10-1-96 
Oregon 2-1-93 7-1-96 
Pennsylvania 3-3-97 3-3-97 
Rhode Island 5-1-97 5-1-97 
South Carolina 10-12-96 10-12-96 
Table A.4. (Continued) 
South Dakota 6-1-94 12-1-96 
Tennessee 9-1-96 10-1-96 
Texas 6-1-96 9-1-97 
Utah 1-1-93 10-1-96 
Vermont 7-1-94 9-20-96 
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Virginia 7-1-95 7-1-95 
Washington 1-1-96 1-1-96 
West Virginia 2-1-96 1-11-97 
Wisconsin 1-1-96 9-1-97 
Wyoming 1-1-97 1-1-97 
Notes: Crouse (1999), the format is mm-dd-yy. Column (1) refers to the date when the earliest waivers or any nation-wide reform implemented, column (2) refers to the date 




























Note: Data tabulated from the 1989-2007 March Current Population Survey. The sample consists of single mothers, single women and married mothers aged 18-45. Standard 
errors of mean are in parentheses. All means and standard deviations are weighted.
Table 8: Disconnected Rate and DID Estimates, by Time Period 
  Single mothers Single women Married mothers Difference-in-Difference 
 
T0 T1 (2)-(1) T0 T1 (5)-(4) T0 T1 (8)-(7) (3)-(6) (3)-(9) 
 Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Before waiver 
(T0=1988,T1=1992) 10.53% 12.45% 1.92% 12.66% 13.32% 0.67% 39.32% 36.37% -2.95% 1.25% 4.87% 
 
0.35% 0.34% 0.48% 0.33% 0.34% 0.59% 0.49% 0.48% 0.91% 0.76% 1.03% 
Waiver 
(T0=1992,T1=1996) 12.45% 12.23% -0.22% 13.32% 12.07% -1.26% 36.37% 32.23% -4.14% 1.04% 3.91% 
 
0.34% 0.34% 0.48% 0.34% 0.33% 0.59% 0.48% 0.47% 0.90% 0.76% 1.02% 
Reform 
(T0=1996,T1=2000) 12.23% 11.96% -0.27% 12.07% 13.02% 0.95% 32.23% 31.90% -0.33% -1.22% 0.06% 
 
0.34% 0.38% 0.47% 0.33% 0.34% 0.57% 0.47% 0.47% 0.88% 0.74% 1.00% 
After reform 
(T0=2000,T1=2004) 11.96% 16.62% 4.66% 13.02% 14.68% 1.66% 31.90% 32.51% 0.61% 3.00% 4.05% 


























Note: Data tabulated from the 1989-2007 March Current Population Survey. The sample consists of single mothers, single women and married mothers aged 18-45. Standard 
errors of mean are in parentheses. All means and standard deviations are weighted.
Table A. 5: Disconnected Rate and DID Estimates, by Time Period 
  Single mothers Single women Married mothers Difference-in-Difference 
 
T0 T1 (2)-(1) T0 T1 (5)-(4) T0 T1 (8)-(7) (3)-(6) (3)-(9) 
 Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Before waiver 
(T0=1988,T1=1992) 10.53% 12.45% 1.92% 12.66% 13.32% 0.67% 39.32% 36.37% -2.95% 1.25% 4.87% 
 
0.35% 0.34% 0.48% 0.33% 0.34% 0.59% 0.49% 0.48% 0.91% 0.76% 1.03% 
Waiver 
(T0=1992,T1=1996) 12.45% 12.23% -0.22% 13.32% 12.07% -1.26% 36.37% 32.23% -4.14% 1.04% 3.91% 
 
0.34% 0.34% 0.48% 0.34% 0.33% 0.59% 0.48% 0.47% 0.90% 0.76% 1.02% 
Reform 
(T0=1996,T1=2000) 12.23% 11.96% -0.27% 12.07% 13.02% 0.95% 32.23% 31.90% -0.33% -1.22% 0.06% 
 
0.34% 0.38% 0.47% 0.33% 0.34% 0.57% 0.47% 0.47% 0.88% 0.74% 1.00% 
After reform 
(T0=2000,T1=2004) 11.96% 16.62% 4.66% 13.02% 14.68% 1.66% 31.90% 32.51% 0.61% 3.00% 4.05% 
  0.38% 0.33% 0.51% 0.34% 0.35% 0.58% 0.47% 0.47% 0.90% 0.77% 1.04% 
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Table A. 6: Time Use Classifications 
Time Use Classification Example of Activities Included 
Direct market work Work-related activities including main jobs and second 
jobs. 
Job searching Reading ads in paper/ on internet, submitting applications, 
interviewed by phone or in person. 
Total market work ‘Direct market work’ plus ‘Job Searching’ and other work 
related activities such as commuting to/from work; 
meals/breaks at work; applying for unemployment 
benefits. 
Home production Food preparation, food presentation, kitchen/food cleanup; 
washing/drying clothes, ironing, dusting, vacuuming, 
indoor cleaning; indoor painting; etc. 
Obtaining goods Grocery shopping; shopping for other goods; comparison 
shopping; clipping coupons; going to bank; going to post 
office; meeting with lawyer; going to veterinarian; etc. 
Total non-market work ‘Home Production’ plus ‘Obtaining Goods’ and all other 
home production including: vehicle repair; outdoor repair; 
outdoor painting; yard work; etc. 
Primary child care Providing the basic needs for children such as rocking the 
child to sleep, breast feeding, grooming and changing 
diapers. 
Educational child care Reading to child, teaching a child, helping child with 
homework and attending meetings at a child's school. 
Recreational child care Playing game with child, attending the child’s sporting 
event, going to the zoo with the child and taking walks 
with the child. 
Total child care The sum of ‘Primary Child Care’, ‘Educational Child 
Care’ and ‘Recreational Child care’. 
Leisure 1 Playing sports, going to movies, going to theater, 
watching television; reading (non coursework), hobbies, 
playing games; using computer (non work),talking on the 
telephone, going to parties, conversing, visiting relatives, 
plant Care, pet care and ‘Recreational Child Care’. 
Leisure 2 ‘Leisure 1’ plus personal care such as sleeping, eating and 
grooming. 
Leisure 3 ‘Leisure 2’ plus ‘Primary Child Care’ and ‘Educational 
Child Care’. 
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